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How do we know whether our own actions were voluntary or involuntary? Intentional theories of sense
of agency suggest that we consciously perceive the intentions that accompany our actions, but
reconstructive theories suggest that we perceive our actions only through the body movements and
other effects that they produce. Intentions would then be mere confabulations, and not bona ﬁde
experiences. Previous work on voluntary action has focused on immediate experiences of authorship,
and few studies have considered memory for voluntary actions. We devised an experiment in which both
voluntary action and involuntary movement always occurred at the same time, but could either involve
the same hand (congruent condition), or different hands (incongruent condition). When signals from the
voluntary and involuntary movements involved different hands, they could therefore potentially
interfere in memory. We found that recall of a voluntary action was unaffected by an incongruent
involuntary movement. In contrast, recall of an involuntary movement was strongly inﬂuenced by an
incongruent voluntary action. Our results demonstrate an “intentional capture” of body movement by
voluntary actions, in support of intentional theories of agency, but contrary to reconstructive theories.
When asked to recall both actions and movements, people's responses are shaped by memory of what
they intended to do, rather than by how their body moved.
& 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Summary
How do we know whether our own actions were voluntary or
involuntary? Intentional theories of sense of agency suggest that we
consciously perceive the intentions that accompany our actions, but
reconstructive theories suggest that we perceive our actions only
through the body movements and other effects that they produce.
Intentions would then be mere confabulations, and not bona ﬁde
experiences. Previous work on voluntary action has focused on
immediate experiences of authorship, and few studies have considered
memory for voluntary actions. We devised an experiment in which
both voluntary action and involuntary movement always occurred at
the same time, but could either involve the same hand (congruent
condition), or different hands (incongruent condition). When signalsublished by Elsevier Ltd. All rights
22
r the terms of the Creative
icense, which permits non-
any medium, provided the
@hammel.rm.dkfrom the voluntary and involuntary movements involved different
hands, they could therefore potentially interfere in memory. We found
that recall of a voluntary action was unaffected by an incongruent
involuntary movement. In contrast, recall of an involuntary movement
was strongly inﬂuenced by an incongruent voluntary action. Our results
demonstrate an “intentional capture” of body movement by voluntary
actions, in support of intentional theories of agency, but contrary to
reconstructive theories. When asked to recall both actions and move-
ments, people's responses are shaped by memory of what they
intended to do, rather than by how their body moved.2. Results and discussion
How do we know whether our own actions were voluntary or
involuntary? This question may seem bizarre, given the general
intuition that voluntary actions involve a ﬁrst person experience of
authorship. However, this intuition is challenged by concepts of
volition emerging from the recent psychology of action. Intentional
theories suggest that people experience conscious intentions
preceding and accompanying their actions (Chambon, Wenke,
Fleming, Prinz, & Haggard, in press; Farrer et al., 2007; Frith,
Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000; Nahab et al., 2010). Intentions arereserved.
Fig. 1. Experimental setup, showing an example incongruent trial. In this trial, the
participant freely chose to make a voluntary action with the left hand. At the same
time, a TMS coil held over the left motor cortex caused an involuntary movement of
the right hand. Thus, voluntary action and involuntary movement were incon-
gruent. On other, congruent, trials, voluntary action and involuntary movement
involved the same hand.
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also produce perception-like experiences (Hallett, 2007). However,
other reconstructive theories have used cases of ambiguous author-
ship to argue that volition is not a bona ﬁde experience at all, but
an inference generated post-hoc to make a coherent narrative
about actions (Wegner, 2002; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). On this
view, the sense of intentional control over our actions involves a
retrospective inference, for example based on feedback from our
body movements, rather than a perceptual experience.
Previous experimental work focussed on immediate experi-
ences of authorship. Few studies have considered the retention of
information in memory about volition and authorship. Memory for
volition is not just an academic detail, but has important applied
aspects. For example, legal systems consider it of paramount
importance whether an action was performed voluntarily or not:
actions that are not voluntary are considered ‘automatisms’ for
which one is less responsible or not responsible at all. When a
defendant enters a guilty plea (i.e., “yes, I did it”), the law assumes
that she has correctly retained and recalled that her original action
was voluntary, and not merely an involuntarily body movement.
However, both the volitional signals stressed by intentional the-
ories of agency, and the somatosensory signals stressed by reconstruc-
tive theories of agency, decay rapidly. Moreover, information about
voluntary action and somatosensory feedback may interfere with each
other in memory. Thus, while the differences between a voluntary and
an involuntary movement are recognisable immediately, the distinc-
tion between the two may blur over time, so that people might be
unable to recall whether a past action was voluntary or involuntary.
Although the experience of voluntary actions and TMS-induced
twitches of the same muscles were shown to be quite different
(Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002), no previous study, to our knowl-
edge, has investigated retention and recall of whether an earlier action
was voluntary or involuntary. We therefore devised an experiment in
which signals from the voluntary action and involuntary movement
could potentially interfere in memory. Importantly, the two theories of
agency described above differ in their predictions about false mem-
ories for voluntary action: these should be relatively common accord-
ing to reconstructive theory, but rare according to intentional theories.
In our study participants freely chose to make a keypress action
with the left or right hand. At the same time, Transcranial Magnetic
Stimulation (TMS) was used to impose an involuntary movement on
the left or right hand, at random. Thus voluntary action and
involuntary body movement were either congruent (on the same
hand) or incongruent (on different hands). We probed source
memory for recent voluntary actions and involuntary movements,
by unpredictably asking “which hand did you move/did the TMS
make move 1/3/5 trials ago?” This provides a situation where
volitional and somatic signals must both be retained in memory,
and may potentially interfere in the incongruent condition. In this
situation, models of action awareness based on strong somatic
feedback and weak access to intention would predict a form of
‘somatic capture of volition’: judgements about which hand was used
for voluntary actionwould be biased by which hand was twitched by
TMS. In contrast, models based on easy access to strong intentional
signals, with only a minimal role for somatic feedback, would predict
‘intentional capture’: judgements about which hand was twitched
would be biased by which hand made voluntary keypress actions.3. Methods
3.1. Participants
We tested 16 subjects (all right handed, 9 females, mean age 25.07 years,
SD¼4.48). One subject was excluded was due to highly stereotyped responding
(see later).3.2. Procedure
Each trial began with a central ﬁxation cross (500 ms), followed by an on-
screen cue specifying a free-choice trial, a forced-choice trial requiring a left hand
response, or a forced-choice trial requiring a right hand response. These cues were
given as central text, and an arrow display immediately below (‘free trial’, ‘left’ or
‘right’; (‘o4 ’, ‘o ’, ‘4 ’)). At the same time as the text and arrow cue
appeared, a sequence of 3 beeps began. The beeps occurred at 750 ms intervals.
Participants were instructed to press a designated key on a computer keyboard at
the same time as the third beep. On forced choice trials, they used the ﬁnger
previously indicated by the instruction, while on free choice trials they could freely
choose whether to press with their left or right index ﬁnger. At the same time as
the third beep a single TMS pulse was given to either the left or the right motor
cortex eliciting an involuntary movement in the contralateral index ﬁnger. The side
of TMS was randomised across trials. As a result, each trial could involve voluntary
action and involuntary movement of the same hand (congruent trial) or of different
hands (incongruent trial – see Fig. 1).
After the third beep, the text and arrow cues disappeared. Five hundred ms
later, a text instruction asked the participant to report verbally either which ﬁnger
they moved for the voluntary action, or which ﬁnger had been twitched, either one,
three or ﬁve trials previously (see Fig. 2). Note that “one trial previously” means the
trial before the one just completed. The participant's unspeeded ‘left’ or ‘right’
verbal report was recorded by the experimenter.
Each participant performed 180 free-choice trials, and 40 forced choice trials
with each hand. The forced choice trials were randomised along with the free-
choice trials. Forced-choice trials were included for methodological reasons, and
were not relevant to our core research question. Including forced-choice trials
discouraged participants from predeciding in advance which hand to use in free-
choice trials, and from using speciﬁc sequences of free choices (e.g., L, R, L, R, L, R).
The requirement to respond to the forced-choice stimuli would help to constrain
the process of free-choice decisions to the time immediately after the appearance
of each cue, and would prevent participants from strategically ‘pre-deciding’
entire runs of free choices in advance. The forced-choice trials were not further
analysed. The trials were delivered in 3 blocks of 80, with a short rest in between
blocks.
Before starting the main task participants complete 40 forced-choice practice
trials, 20 for each side. The institutional ethics committee approved the procedure
and each participant gave informed consent and completed a TMS safety screening
form. No adverse events occurred during the experiment.4. Data acquisition
The tasks were presented using Cogent 2000 (Laboratory of
Neurobiology, Functional Imaging Laboratory, and Institute
of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London; http://
www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent_2000.php) in Matlab 2011b (The
MathWorks, Natick, MA.). Two Magstim 200 stimulators (Whit-
land, UK) each with a ﬁgure-of-eight coil were used to stimulate
the primary motor cortices of the left and right hemispheres.
For each participant we ﬁrst determined the location (hot spot)
that elicited the highest response to the TMS pulse in the slightly-
contracted ﬁrst dorsal interosseus muscle, by searching the con-
tralateral sensorimotor area in a 1 cm grid. Once the hot spot was
found the motor threshold was determined as the lowest stimu-
lator output required to elicit a MEP of at least 50 μV in three of
Fig. 2. (A) Trial design. An instruction indicated whether participants should make voluntary actions with the left or right hand (forced choice trials), or should freely choose
which hand to use (free choice). Actions were synchronised with the third of a series of pacing tones. A TMS pulse was delivered to either the left or right hemisphere at the
time of the third tone, producing involuntary movement of the right or left hand respectively. When voluntary action and involuntary movement involved the same hand,
the trial was classed as congruent, otherwise it was classed as incongruent. (B) Recall task. Participants were asked after 1, 3 or 5 intervening trials which hand they had used
to make the voluntary action, or which hand had been involuntarily moved by TMS, on the to-be-recalled trial.
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for each hemisphere. MEPS were digitised at 5 kHz. For the left
hemisphere thresholds ranged from 40% to 59% of stimulator
output (mean, 47.5%) and for the right hemisphere thresholds
ranged from 45% to 59% of stimulator output (mean, 50.2%). Finally,
TMS output in the experimental conditions was set at 120% of
relaxed threshold. One subject reported that the TMS-induced
twitches interfered with her voluntary actions, for her the stimu-
lator output was therefore reduced to 100% of relaxed threshold.1 GES¼Generalised eta-squared.5. Data analysis
We analysed only those judgements that referred to free-choice
trials, since we were primarily interested in source memory for
voluntary actions. Free choice trials were classiﬁed as congruent if
voluntary action and involuntary movement had occurred on the
same hand, or incongruent otherwise. Because we had no hypoth-
esis about hemispheric specialisation, we collapsed data across left
and right hands, as an effect of no interest. Our main dependent
variable was percentage of correct recall. In addition, we analysed
MEP amplitudes. For each trial the difference between the max-
imum and minimum value (peak-to-valley) for the MEP
15–50 ms after the TMS pulse was taken as the MEP amplitude.
Finally, we measured the latency of the voluntary action with
respect to the go-signal (onset of the third beep).
To check for stereotyped responding, the number of runs (i.e.,
successive repetitions of a single voluntary action choice) for each
participant was calculated. A low number of runs indicate that the
participant did not switch between left and right, but rather
repeated a single action choice across trials. The mean numberof runs was 94.33, SD 21.86. One participant produced very few
runs, (48, 2.12SD below the mean, suggesting a stereotyped
pattern of responding) and was therefore excluded.6. Results
The mean percentage of congruent trials was 49.3% (SD 4.2%).
This value did not differ from the 50% level expected from an
unbiased random choice mechanism, such as chance. Chi-squared
testing of individual participants' choices revealed that no parti-
cipant contributed signiﬁcantly more congruent trials than
expected by chance. Two participants contributed more incon-
gruent trials than might be expected by chance, but two such
results in our sample of 15 might be expected from the 5% type I
error rate used for each individual test.
Accuracy on the recall task is shown in Fig. 3. The data were
analysed using a repeated measures ANOVA with factors of n-back
(recall of a target event 1,3 or 5 trials ago), the event that the
participant was instructed to recall (voluntary action or twitch),
and whether, on the to-be-recalled trial, voluntary action and
twitch were on the same hand or on different hands (congruent,
incongruent). We found a predicted main effect of n-back
F(2,28)¼33.25, po0.001, GES¼0.251, with recall decreasing
monotonically with elapsed trials We also found marginal main
effect of congruence in the predicted direction, with better recall
for congruent than for incongruent trials F(1,14)¼4.58, p¼0.0506,
GES¼0.018. More interestingly, there was an interaction between
Fig. 3. Mean recall accuracy as a function of number of intervening trials, event
recalled, and congruence/incongruence between voluntary action and involuntary
movement. Error bars show 95% conﬁdence intervals. Chance level is 50%.
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interaction was explored with post-hoc t-tests. Recall of voluntary
actions was unaffected by whether the involuntary movement on
the target trial was on the congruent or incongruent hand: mean
congruent-incongruent difference¼0.0067 (95%CI: 5.958; 5.972), t
(14)¼0.002, p¼0.998, r2¼0.0006. In contrast, recall of involuntary
movement was signiﬁcantly worse when the voluntary action was
performed by the other hand compared to the same hand: mean
congruent-incongruent difference 8.084 (95%CI: 12.81; 3.36),
t(14)¼3.67, p¼0.0025, r2¼0.7. Thus, recall of involuntary move-
ments was captured by incongruent voluntary actions, but recall of
voluntary actions was not captured by incongruent involuntary
movements. The results of the post-hoc testing are conﬁrmed by
inspection of the conﬁdence intervals in Fig. 3. When voluntary
action and involuntary movement were incongruent, recall of the
involuntary movement was never signiﬁcantly above chance, even
after a single intervening trial. That is, making an incongruent
voluntary action with the other hand effectively removed informa-
tion in memory about which hand had been twitched. Finally, there
was also an interaction between congruencyn-back F(2,28)¼
5.061, p¼0.013, GES¼0.038, due to a more rapid decay of perfor-
mance in the incongruent condition. There were no other signiﬁcant
interactions or main effects.
We next investigated whether the recall of involuntary move-
ments depended on the amplitude of the evoked twitch, by
comparing MEP amplitudes for involuntary movements that were
correctly and incorrectly recalled. No signiﬁcant difference was
found (mean MEP correct, 2.38 mV, incorrect 2.40 mV, F(1,14)¼
0.0193, p¼0.8916), nor was there any effect of congruence, nor any
interaction. (all ps4¼0.085). Similarly, we tested whether the
ability to recall the source hand of a voluntary action depended on
the MEP size. No signiﬁcant difference was found, nor was there
any effect of congruence, nor any interaction (all p4¼0.149).
Finally, we compared the latency of voluntary actions that were
correctly recalled vs those that were incorrectly recalled. We found
no difference, no effect of congruence, and no interaction. (all
p4¼0.104). Thus, recall performance, and the degree of inter-
ference in memory between voluntary action and involuntary
movement appeared to be independent of the key physical
parameters of both voluntary and involuntary movement.7. Discussion
We wanted to investigate if memory for action depends more
on the intention to act, or on somatic feedback from the body.To do this, we developed a novel paradigm in which both
voluntary action and involuntary movement were always present,
and in which we could assess the mutual interference between
these two events in memory. We asked the participants to recall
the source, i.e., either the left or right hand, of either a voluntary
action or an involuntary movement they had recently made. We
found that source memory for voluntary action was unaffected by
an incongruent involuntary movement, while source memory for
involuntary movements was strongly affected by incongruent
voluntary actions. Because participants made forced-choice
responses, errors in recall on incongruent trials could be inter-
preted as biasing or capture of one signal by the other. We found
highly asymmetric interference in memory for actions, with
voluntary actions biasing source memory for involuntary move-
ment, but not vice versa.
Could this effect simply reﬂect a difference in signal strength
between voluntary actions and involuntary movements? Differ-
ences in signal strength could arise either at the perceptual stage,
or in memory itself. An alternative explanation of our results
might be attempted in either case. We therefore consider these
possible alternative explanations in turn.
7.1. Perceptual factors
Could our results be due to failure to perceive the involuntary
movement? This seems unlikely: the TMS-evoked twitches were
always suprathreshold, and salient for the participants. Could the
twitches nevertheless have been masked by voluntary actions?
Because masking is greatest between signals that overlap in space
and time, this view would predict particularly poor perception of
the MEP in congruent trials, and also effects of MEP amplitude and
voluntary latency. None of these three predictions was supported
by our data. Alternatively, the poor recall in the incongruent
condition might reﬂect division of attention. Participants might
allocate attention to the hand making the voluntary action. They
cannot allocate attention to the involuntary movement in the
same way, because they cannot anticipate which hand will be
twitched. Thus, on incongruent trials their attention may be
focussed on the hand that will act, rather than the hand that
twitched. This explanation also seems unlikely, because pilot data
showed that recall of involuntary movements was close to ceiling
when probed immediately, without subsequent intervening trials.
Moreover, previous studies conﬁrm that participants are able to
immediately judge the amplitude (Haggard & Whitford, 2004) and
timing of TMS-evoked twitches, even in the presence of a
simultaneous intention to act (Haggard & Clark, 2003). In addition,
if recall of involuntary movements had been limited by perceptual
or attentional factors, larger twitches would presumably be better
recalled than smaller twitches, yet our analyses did not ﬁnd this.
We therefore suggest that poor recall of involuntary movements in
the incongruent condition is due to a bias or capture in memory,
and not simply due to poor perception or attention.
7.2. Memory trace strength
Next, we consider whether differences between in strength of
memory traces for voluntary actions and involuntary movements
could explain our results. According to this explanation, the
memory trace for involuntary movements should have a lower
strength than that for voluntary actions. This could either reﬂect a
memory trace for the involuntary movement itself, or a memory
trace for the source (left hand, right hand) where the movement
was experienced. Several lines of evidence make either explana-
tion implausible, and suggest that our results are not simply due to
trace strength. First, recall rates in congruent trials were similar for
both involuntary movements and for voluntary actions. This
Table 2
Mean (SD across participants) correct recall (%) as a function of number of
intervening trials, event recalled, and congruence between voluntary action and
involuntary movement.
n-Back
Incongruent Congruent
Voluntary
action
Involuntary
movement
Voluntary
action
Involuntary
movement
1 74.7 (16.3) 58.6 (18.9) 78.3 (15.9) 78.5 (17.6)
3 60.7 (16.8) 54.0 (8.8) 59.4 (12.1) 60.7 (16)
5 54.8 (11.2) 52.3 (12.8) 52.4 (19) 50 (13.9)
Table 3
ANOVA results for the design shown in Table 1.
Effect DFn DFd F p-value GES
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voluntary action signals do not differ in trace strength, but only in
the susceptibility to bias by the other signal. Second, trace strength
might be lower for weak signals than for strong signals, suggesting
that smaller involuntary movements would be less well remem-
bered. However, our analyses did not suggest any relation between
these capture effects and physical parameters of movements. In
particular, we found that MEP size was essentially identical for
incongruent trials that were recalled correctly vs incorrectly (see
Table 1). This effectively rules out explanations based on analogue
memory traces linked to signal strength. Finally, our task did not
require participants to remember the physical parameters of
involuntary movements, but only their source in the left or right
hand. Therefore, an efﬁcient strategy might recode somatosensory
signals about involuntary movement into a 1-bit categorical code
left, or right. There is considerable evidence from studies of non-
motor memory that contextual source information is indeed coded
independently of trace strength (Rugg et al., 2012). Our pilot study,
supplementary analyses, and discussion of perceptual factors
above, all suggest that categorisation of involuntary movement
signals as left or right should be unproblematic for our partici-
pants, and could not account for poor recall of involuntary move-
ment. Moreover, our task would require voluntary actions to be
categorised in exactly the same way, as left or right. Thus, the
differential recall of voluntary actions and involuntary movements
cannot easily be explained if the memory traces are coded as a
categorical description of the source/context, rather than in an
analogue form.
Several other potential alternative explanations of our effect
can also be ruled out. First, memory for a previous action or
movement is strongly affected by subsequent events (retroactive
interference). However, the randomised design of our experiment
ensured that the events occurring between the to-be-recalled trial
and the moment of recall itself were fully balanced across condi-
tions. Second, participants could potentially have delayed their
voluntary actions, and then responded with the hand twitched by
TMS. This strategy would reduce the number of incongruent
trials, perhaps leading to changes in memory strength. However,
we found no evidence that incongruent trials were under-
represented. Third, participants' recall of twitches could have been
captured by the click of TMS and cutaneous scalp sensation in the
contralateral hemisphere. However, this account cannot readily
explain why click capture would occur only in incongruent trials,
and not in congruent trials, without additional implausible and ad
hoc assumptions.
7.3. Intentional capture
We therefore interpret our result as a bias in memory, or
“intentional capture” of involuntary movement. That is, when
people are asked to recall involuntary movements, their memories
are biased by intentional signals describing what they voluntarily
choose to do at the time. This is not a simple response bias:
the response categories in our study were ‘left’ and ‘right’, but the
effect of interest was a bias to report whatever hand had made the
voluntary action on that trial, rather than one speciﬁc hand.
Interestingly, recent studies of visual memory have suggested that
the precision of spatial information held in memory is reduced byTable 1
Mean (SD across participants) MEP amplitude (mV).
Correct Incorrect
Congruent 2.61 (0.85) 2.67 (0.91)
Incongruent 2.73 (0.87) 2.64 (0.86)interference from subsequent items (Zokaei, Gorgoraptis, Bahrami,
Bays, & Husain, 2011). Our result could be explained within the
same framework, if the degree of interference between voluntary
action and involuntary movement were asymmetric. We suggest
that ‘intentional capture’ arises because voluntary actions interfere
more with the coding of involuntary movements than vice versa
Tables 2 and 3.
The involuntary movements studied here were generated by
stimulating primary motor cortex, yet recall of these movements
clearly differed from recall of voluntary actions. The component of
voluntary action responsible for differential interference in mem-
ory cannot be due to low-level motor execution and somatic
feedback alone, but must arise at a higher, intentional level. Our
results are consistent with the view that an efferent signal arising
upstream of M1 contributes to the superior source memory for
voluntary actions, and biases memory for body movement.
Intentional theories give a strong role for intentions, relative to
somatic signals, in the experience of and memory for action.
Reconstructive theories propose the reverse. Our results clearly
favour intentional over reconstructive theories, at least as regards
the retention of information about actions in memory.
A proponent of reconstructive theories might argue that our
notion of confabulation is too strong. Our claim that ‘intentional
capture’ supports intentional theories over reconstruction theories
might then be invalid. A weaker form of reconstructive theory
suggests that reconstruction of agency requires congruence
between “prior thoughts” and subsequent actions. However, our
research question was not concerned with whether actions can be
confabulated, and not with whether prior thoughts can be con-
fabulated. That is, our paradigm is sensitive to what Pacherie
(2008) calls proximal intentions, close in time to the action. Prior
thoughts, on the other hand, resemble distal intentions.
Strong reconstructivist insists that prior thoughts are confabu-
lated, while weak reconstructivism requires only reconstruction of
proximal intentions. In our study, we deal with intentions to move
the left or the right hand. These would be relatively proximal,
because they relate to a speciﬁc motor means used to achieve the
action goal (Pacherie, 2008), and are speciﬁed only relatively late
in the voluntary action chain (Haggard and Eimer, 1999). In a
previous study, participants appeared to reconstruct intentionalCongruency 1 14 4.580 0.050 0.0184
Volition 1 14 1.948 0.185 0.0215
n-back 2 28 33.268 0.000nnn 0.2462
Congruencyvolition 1 14 5.986 0.028n 0.0185
Congruencyn-back 2 28 5.061 0.013n 0.0379
Volitionn-back 2 28 0.679 0.515 0.0072
Congruencyvolitionn-back 2 28 1.220 0.310 0.0123
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cues and visual feedback (Wegner, Sparrow, & Winerman, 2004).
Therefore, we think that our paradigm should have been sensitive
to reconstruction, had it occurred. In any case, our data suggest
that some internal action-preparation signals are more important
than afferent sensorimotor signals in memory for voluntary action.
Our results could be interpreted within a source-monitoring
framework (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Information
about sources of voluntary action biased our participants' mem-
ories about the sources of an externally-caused involuntary move-
ment. Abnormal source monitoring in schizophrenics has been
linked to auditory hallucinations (with normal inner speech being
erroneously heard as an external voice: (Waters et al., 2012)), and
to abnormalities of voluntary action such as delusions of control
(with consequences of voluntary actions being experienced as
externally-caused: (Shergill, Samson, Bays, Frith, & Wolpert,
2005)). This previous work on recognition of actions focussed on
immediate awareness, rather than memory. Nevertheless, schizo-
phrenic patients' auditory and visual hallucination scores are
known to be associated with biases in corresponding verbal and
visual source memory (Brébion, Ohlsen, Bressan, & David, 2012).
Therefore, biases in memory for volition in our task could shed
light on the altered experience of volition in schizophrenia.
The law assumes that healthy adults can remember and report
their own actions and intentions, or mens rea. Our results offer
some support for this assumption: our participants knew and
remembered what they voluntarily did. Indeed, this information
seemed to inﬂuence their memory about what involuntarily
happened to them. Crucially, however, we found no evidence for
creation of false memories about voluntary actions. For example,
an involuntary twitch of the left hand could not induce the false
memory of making a voluntary action with the left hand when in
fact there had been a voluntary action with the right hand. This
may be surprising, given studies showing that simply imagining
(Garry, Manning, Loftus, & Sherman, 1996), or observing (Lindner,
Echterhoff, Davidson, & Brand, 2010) an action can induce the false
memory of having performed it. However, those studies typically
involve much longer memory delays than ours, and individuate
actions by praxic/semantic classes (e.g., “shake the bottle”) rather
than by the effectors or motoric means used to make them. We
suggest that false action memories induced in this way may lack
convincing motoric detail about how the action was performed.Acknowledgements
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